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There is a growing imperative for responses to climate change to go beyond
incremental adjustments, aiming instead for society-wide transformation. In this
context, sociotechnical (ST) transitions and social–ecological (SE) resilience are
two prominent normative agendas. Reviewing these literatures reveals how both
share a complex-systems epistemology with inherent limitations, often produ-
cing managerial governance recommendations and foregrounding material over
social drivers of change. Further interdisciplinary dialogue with social theory is
essential if these frameworks are to become more theoretically robust and capa-
ble of informing effective, let alone transformational, climate change governance.
To illustrate this potential, ideas from Deleuze and Guattari’s political writing as
well as other approaches that utilize the notion social ﬁelds (as opposed to socio-
systems) are combined to more fully theorize the origins and enactment of social
change. First, the logic of systems is replaced with the contingency of assem-
blages to reveal how pluralism, not elitism, can produce more ambitious and
politicized visions of the future. In particular, this view encourages us to see
social and ecological tensions as opportunities for thinking and acting differently
rather than as mere technical problems to be solved. Secondly, the setting of
social ﬁelds is introduced to situate and explain the power of ideas and the role
of agency in times of uncertainty. The potential of such insights is already visible
in some strands of climate change mitigation and adaptation research, but more
needs to be done to advance this ﬁeld and to bring it into dialogue with the
mainstream systems based literature. © 2016 The Authors. WIREs Climate Change published
by Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
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INTRODUCTION
The policy implications of the Fifth AssessmentReport of the Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change1 (IPCC) are both deep and wide ran-
ging. In particular, the contribution of Working
Group II2 calls for timely and signiﬁcant society-wide
transformational change. Such an undertaking will
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need to secure broad scientiﬁc, political, and civic
input and support in order to maximize the diversity
of, and buy-in for, multiple pathways of change
toward a climate compatible future. Whether
through the IPCC or any other social institution,
the way climate and society relations are conceptua-
lized greatly inﬂuences the way their coevolution is
interpreted and responded to.3 Thus, when such
large-scale and deliberate (not emergent) transforma-
tions of society are invoked questions of representa-
tion, ethics and sustainability immediately arise.4,5
Whose envisioned future are we pursing and along
which pathways? Who bears the cost of the transfor-
mation and who reaps the beneﬁts? What weighting
is given to environmental, social, and economic prio-
rities? Interdisciplinary social science that draws on
insights from social, political, economic, and behav-
ioral research is well placed to help answer such
questions.5–8
Within the climate change literature transfor-
mational responses to environmental change are gen-
erally deﬁned by their scale, novelty, and/or spatial
reach compared to incremental or retrenchment
strategies.9–11 Such signiﬁcant levels of change that
affect fundamental aspects of society are likely to
involve multiple social processes. Based on reviews of
the global environmental change literature, these pro-
cesses can be grouped into a typology of: practical
innovations in technology, management strategies,
and behavior, political contests between incumbents
and challengers over the rules of the game (i.e., how
society functions) and personal explorations of indi-
vidual and collective beliefs, values, and world-
views.5,12,13 One of the greatest challenges for
environmental social science is to address these inter-
related aspects of social change in a balanced and
interwoven way.
Climate change mitigation—the act of reducing
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions—is often
characterized as a social and technological problem
with social and technological solutions, for example,
involving overconsumption and polluting infrastruc-
ture that can be directly remedied through behavior
change and low-carbon technology. Accordingly, the
sociotechnical (ST) systems framework explores the
interrelated social and technological processes
through which sustainability innovations emerge and
are consolidated.14,15 Climate change adaptation—
the act of responding to anticipated and present
impacts of climate change—has been guided more by
social–ecological (SE) systems research, which
emphasizes the interdependence of society and eco-
systems, stressing that successful responses to a chan-
ging climate will require high levels of adaptive
capacity in both.16,17 As these frameworks share a
common foundation in ‘complex systems’ thinking
there have been attempts to draw theoretical and
applied lessons between the two.11,18,19 However,
conceptual blind spots remain (most notably around
issues of power and politics), suggesting that the sys-
tems epistemology itself may well be the barrier to a
fuller understanding of social change. Ultimately,
both frameworks could beneﬁt from extradisciplinary
considerations reaching beyond the boundaries of
systems thinking to engage with more explicitly soci-
ological and political modes of thought.20–23 Review-
ing and expanding on these claims, this article
presents two examples of such interdisciplinary
endeavors that could inform transformational climate
change research and practice.
ST TRANSITIONS AND CLIMATE
CHANGE MITIGATION
The notion of a ST system emerged from the
technology-oriented ﬁeld of innovations studies.
Through a series of perspective widening turns, the
inﬂuence of social institutions and practices was fur-
ther integrated into the framework. Much of this
inﬂuence coincided with the emergence of Science
and Technology Studies, which problematized linear
understandings of scientiﬁc and technological innova-
tion by drawing attention to the values, intentions,
meaning-making, and subversive involvement of
humans at all stages of research and practice.14,24
Examples ranged from the small scale to the large;
solar panels being used to dry laundry or mosquito
nets used for ﬁshing through to low-carbon energy
options that either decentralize or consolidate exist-
ing supply chains and their associated web of power
relations. Social theory too beneﬁted from a closer
focus on human and nonhuman (technological/eco-
logical) relations by breaking down such conceptual
dichotomies to reveal their effect on socially
embedded processes of domination and power.25,26
The extent to which this more radical work has fed
into ST systems research varies greatly across the lit-
erature but overall is minimal. At its most social, the
ST system is an interdisciplinary construct encapsu-
lating the prevailing modus operandi of a given (sec-
tor of ) society and its embedded technological
artifacts. Typically, it is toward the normative goal of
sustainability that this work points, prescribing tran-
sition pathways toward new and more desirable rela-
tionships between society and technology. More
historical ST research has addressed technological
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development over longer periods of time, drawing
useful insights about the (often slow or disjointed)
coevolution of their attendant social institutions.27–29
This work has been a timely reminder for innova-
tions studies and sustainability transitions enthusiasts
to heed the power of embedded interests and ideas,30
but it features less prominently in the climate change
area of this ﬁeld.
Much of the ST transitions literature presents a
multilevel perspective of change. Therein, desirable
change toward sustainability is understood to result
from the modulation of three simultaneous scalar
pressures: instability within, and competition among,
ST regimes (meso level), successful innovations from
smaller niches (micro level), and changes in the
broader social and material landscape (macro
level).14,31 Whilst this may sound inclusive the main
focus is on practical issues (e.g., behavior change,
technology, and management strategies) with only
limited consideration of the institutional context and
even less sensitivity to the interpretations, values, and
intentions of actors. With regards to climate change
mitigation ST transitions seek potential social (e.g.,
low-carbon lifestyle choices) and technical (e.g.,
deploying low-carbon technology) ‘solutions,’ often
presenting them as desirable recommendations for
any given sector or strata of society.32–35 Granted,
ﬂexibility in implementation is advised but the socio-
cultural context and political implications of adopt-
ing certain solutions over others is rarely considered
in great depth.
The potentially technocratic narrative of a ST
transition leaves little room for exploring more per-
sonal and political drivers of change such as
agency,13,36–38 contestation,22,39,40 and discursive
diversity.8,41 Whilst some ST research, such as the
historical strand cited above, does include political
institutional and actor-oriented elements attempts to
include them in contemporary climate change
research is hampered by a pervasive tendency toward
reductive methodologies that quantify, model, and
control their effects.42,43 The mediating role of these
dynamic social factors on the very practical innova-
tions described in most ST studies is often underack-
nowledged. Thus, it may be this very blind spot that
prevents applied ST transitions initiatives from
achieving the transformational changes they seek and
which are demanded of them by the urgency of miti-
gating dangerous climate change.44–46 Consequently,
the potential of adopting concepts and/or theorizing
in conjunction with nonsystem based perspectives
has been recognized.47 Initial responses from ST
scholars have suggested fruitful theoretical develop-
ments44,47 leading to several meta-reviews that call
for a much more politicized and interdisciplinary
research agenda going forward.20,21,23,48,49
TRANSITION MANAGEMENT
The shortcomings of a predominantly behavioral and
technical view of social change are particularly perti-
nent to the part of ST systems literature that deals
with governance, also known as transition manage-
ment (TM). Following the multilevel narrative out-
lined above, TM seeks to simultaneously destabilize
the existing regime whilst fostering, and upscaling,
niche-level innovation.23 The very idea of governing
or purposively managing change in complex systems
would appear paradoxical to ﬁrst-generation systems
theorists who adopted the term ‘complex’ precisely
to describe the unpredictable and nonlinear nature of
cause and effect in certain systems.50 Despite their
apolitical overtones, processes such as emergence,
coevolution, and self-organization have been built
into the lexicon of ST governance.51,52 For example,
the undesirable attributes of a given system (e.g., high
levels of emissions from the transport sector) are tar-
geted through changes to the constituent elements
(e.g., transportation technology) and their functions
(e.g., nonessential and inexpensive aviation). Comb-
ing this strategy with principles from the wider gov-
ernance literature, TM seeks to produce fundamental
change in the attributes and functions of ST systems
through the following levers:
• Strategic—envisioning of futures, pathways,
and long-term goals
• Tactical—setting agendas through negotiating
and coalition building
• Operational—experimenting with and imple-
menting projects
• Reﬂexive—monitoring, evaluating and learning
from feedback
Whilst this governance toolkit is based on the theo-
retical foundations of a complex systems view of
the world that is favored by environmental social
sciences and other ﬁelds working on ‘wicked pro-
blems’ its practical applications run into signiﬁcant
problems. This is not because ST systems truly
are unpredictable or random but because they are
subject to a range of sociopolitical processes that are
largely absent from a systems epistemology. In other
words, the institutionalized ideas and power relations
that provoke/mediate/resist social change are
grossly underappreciated by a governance style that
breaks society down into broadly consensual,
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experimental, and self-organizing systems. This
appears particularly problematic in governance con-
texts with weak accountability (e.g., fossil fuel
extraction in undemocratic countries), where political
institutions are entrenched in a dominant logic (e.g.,
economic growth at all costs) and wherever hege-
monic power is exercised (e.g., global capitalism). It
is acknowledged even in TM itself that ‘only a rela-
tively small number of actors will be involved in
strategic and tactical activities’ (Ref 51, p. 156), sug-
gesting that already inﬂuential actors are most likely
to secure a presence at the crucial envisioning stage.
Who deﬁnes the parameters and pathways of the
transition is a fundamental yet underexplored ques-
tion. As a result, some TM initiatives may not be
achieving their desired transformational ends because
the steering committee is made up of dominant mem-
bers of society who have a vested interest retaining
or only partially reforming the status quo.46 Further-
more, should a momentum for change begin to accel-
erate too quickly then these actors are in a position
to protect their own interests—possibly at the
expense of the already marginalized53—during an
unavoidable period of transition.46 However, it
would not sufﬁce to merely replace those responsible
for steering the transition with the marginalized and
disaffected. Common to both scenarios is the prob-
lem of a relatively small number of actors without
either the will or the power to unite and govern
something as fragmented and diverse as human soci-
ety toward one consensual vision of a sustainable
future.
This particular limitation stems in part from
the system perspective’s use of the ecological concept
of isomorphism54—the idea that systems have a ten-
dency to develop a similarity in structure or shape as
they evolve. This is illustrated succinctly by the ST
transitions narrative of a more sustainable niche ‘up
scaling,’ that is, converting and absorbing resistance
as it develops until a critical mass is reached and the
whole system tips toward this new conﬁguration.
Two key assumptions underpinning this view of
social change are objectionable. First, whilst it may
sound like a story of bottom-up innovation, and tri-
umph, the practice of TM described above depends
on benevolent top–down intervention and guidance.
It is up to a privileged few to select, incubate, and
then mainstream their preferred low-carbon technol-
ogies and behaviors. Secondly, TM generally rejects
the possibility of abrupt and disjointed change. Its
narrow view of power as an entrenched and static
force to be chipped away at leads to the counterintui-
tive principle of radical change in incremental steps
expressed by the mantra of ‘more evolution than
revolution.’55 It is a short step from here to the
assumption that fundamental change can only avoid
causing catastrophic collapse or inducing insur-
mountable resistance in an incumbent regime if it
emerges through an isomorphic process choreo-
graphed by an elite vanguard (Ref 51, p. 145). Such
managerialist forms of governance overlook the way
existing power relations can be reproduced through
the very political institutions and social arrangements
responsible for pursuing sustainability.22 This failure
to acknowledge the variety of discursive and idea-
tional motives behind decision-making at multiple
levels by multiple actors downplays the daily struggle
of strategists and practitioners to either accelerate or
resist transformational change.37,41,56 It is worth not-
ing here that this democratic tension—which is a
recurring theme within the ﬁeld of sustainable
development—is by no means peculiar to TM. As the
imperative for wide-spread social action on sustaina-
bility grows it is vital that accountability and demo-
cratic process is not simply assumed, made implicit
or even put on hold,57 but is instead ‘opened up.’8
Partly because of these shortcomings many cli-
mate change mitigation initiatives guided by elite
driven variations of TM will continue to fall short of
the transformational imperative for rapid and drastic
emissions reductions targets. For instance, in many
high-emitting countries long-term policy goals (such
as the UK’s 80% reduction in emissions by 2050) are
at odds with short-term political cycles.58 Not only is
there an incentive for policymakers to delay strong
action until after they are reelected or are no longer
in power,59 but there is ample opportunity for doing
so through institutionalized political processes
(reviews, debates, vetoes, etc.) that are difﬁcult to cir-
cumvent.60 Here we can expect to see more conserva-
tive climate policymaking, for example, labeling
existing actions as pro-climate rather than novel or
innovative actions capable of accelerating low-carbon
trajectories.59,61,62 Despite the seemingly global
allure of transition discourses TM may be equally
problematic if applied by emerging emitters and low-
income countries where its implicit assumption—or
outright ignorance—of democratic procedure could
be easily exploited by ruling elites and unaccountable
institutions.63,64 Ultimately, the ST systems frame-
work favors a process of innovation based on hard
to reach consensus over more contentious politics
and pluralistic pathways.8,41,65 Describing, as well as
prescribing, society-wide transformations capable of
unprecedented emissions reductions will require a
much greater awareness of how competing world-
views and political processes govern the pursuit of
sustainability transitions.
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SE RESILIENCE AND CLIMATE
CHANGE ADAPTATION
Placing society within, alongside or before its natural
environment entails different ontological and episte-
mological commitments that can lead to very differ-
ent forms of politics and governance.18,26,66 The
1960s and 1970s were a key era for the idea of eco-
logical limits to economic growth and the emergence
of a holistic ‘complex systems’ approach to studying
society–environment interactions.66,67 The study of
SE systems places the interdependence of societies
and ecosystems in the spotlight; it is broadly applied
in the (social) environmental sciences and has a great
deal to say about process of change. Drawing heavily
on systems theory and ecology, the inﬂuential book
Panarchy68 developed an adaptive cycle conceptuali-
zation of change arguing that social systems, in con-
junction with the ecosystems they depend on, can
maintain their vital functions through cycles of crea-
tive destruction and recourse to multiple states
of equilibrium. According to this view, the direction
of travel in times of change is determined by the pres-
ence and interaction of three attributes:
• Potential—utilizing sources of capital for strate-
gic action
• Connectivity—regulating practices and mediat-
ing shocks
• Resilience—maintaining vital functions through
recourse to multiple states
In the context of adapting to the impacts of climate
change this theoretical framework has been criticized
for lacking empirical validity and for paying insufﬁ-
cient attention to human livelihoods and their institu-
tionalized contexts.69,70 Its applications appear
almost exclusively concerned with management stra-
tegies and contain minimal consideration of how
these are situated within wider political structures or
how they might be interpreted—and thus responded
to in discourse and practice—by actors with differing
values and worldviews.71–73 These limitations
become more profound as climatic uncertainty
increases across time and space, putting pressure on
SE systems to be prepared for the worst.74 In these
instances, where preemptive and transformational
actions are called for, a much more politicized theory
of change will need to be evoked.10 Questions
around why certain SE system states appear more
viable than others cannot be adequately answered
using the descriptive terminology of multiple equilib-
rium and creative destruction. As with ST transitions,
what is missing from the SE system theory of change
is a dynamic understanding of power, that is, how
and why do these system attributes and processes
serve the interests of some whilst inhibiting those of
others?
ADAPTIVE COMANAGEMENT
OF RESOURCES
Following the adaptive cycle theory, SE systems
research often advocates a form of multiactor gov-
ernance using networks to increase resource pools,
connectivity, and opportunities for social learning.17
Based on studies of natural resource management
practices, this process of ‘adaptive comanagement’
pursues SE resilience through polycentric, participa-
tory, and accountable processes—thereby achieving a
diversity of input, good compatibility between
knowledge and context and a safeguard against over-
looking issues of social justice.75,76 However, as with
TM, in practice this approach faces signiﬁcant bar-
riers, not least because the theoretical assumptions
and practical traditions upon which it is based were
developed for small-scale resource management with-
out the multilevel complexity of globalized social and
political institutions. Reﬂexivity and learning through
experimentation are laudable—although never purely
technical—governance principles but generalizing les-
sons and prescribing ideal type processes should be
done with caution. Numerous attempts to impose
‘good governance’ on the way societies adapt
to ecological variability have suffered from an
underappreciation of power relations and cultural
difference, or, in other words, from institutional
incompatibility.19,23,76 For instance, when interna-
tional institutions such as the UNFCCC or the World
Bank propose various market-driven adaptation
initiatives such as ‘payments for ecosystem services’
or natural disaster insurance schemes, they rely on
the smooth translation of a set of neoclassical eco-
nomic assumptions that are often fundamentally at
odds with the sociocultural norms of their intended
destination.77–79 Whilst these assumptions may be
deeply embedded within the functioning of advanced
liberal democracies, it is not so the world over. Fully
recognizing and expressing the social, cultural, and
political peculiarities of other societies—who often
happen to be the ones most at risk of dangerous cli-
mate change impacts—is a task that may well be
beyond the aggregated discourses of mainstream
international forms of climate governance,40,63,78
especially those that perceive environmental pro-
blems through a decontextualized SE systems lens.
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Climate change adaptation research that does
not solely rely on a SE system perspective has
engaged with some of these issues, for example, cul-
ture, perception, and behavior.80–82 Insights from
this work, particularly around power and agency,
can be productively incorporated into the SE systems
perspective. However as with many interdisciplinary
dialogues there are epistemological and normative
limitations. For example, the notion of an institu-
tional entrepreneur—which has striking similarities
to the niche innovators found in ST transitions—has
gained conceptual currency in SE systems research.
This idea builds in part on Folke et al.17 emphasizing
social learning and leadership in adaptive govern-
ance, but also in part as a response to the criticisms
leveled against climate policies that cast individuals
as mere respondents to, rather than carriers of, trans-
formational change.8,38 Seen as the harbingers of dis-
ruptive innovation these individuals can guide
systems in the desired direction of adaptation
depending on their levels of resources, power and
positioning within a network.83,84 However, as Rick-
ards et al.37 illustrate, even senior decision makers
who support strong action on climate change are
constrained by their social milieu, often to the
extent that transformational society-wide change is
moot. One encouraging aspect of this research is the
acknowledgement of actors’ capacities for agitation,
that is, for proactively opening windows of opportu-
nity to drive social and political change.84,85 Bringing
the discourses, practices, strategies, and (most of all)
the interactions of various inﬂuential actors (e.g.,
social movement leaders, boundary organizations,
local activists, social entrepreneurs, and policy-
makers) into sharper focus may reveal undercurrents
of discontent and conduits for innovation.
Many climate change adaptation initiatives
based on the SE systems perspective aim to increase a
society’s levels of potential, connectivity, and espe-
cially resilience. Yet, to derive a policy or governance
mandate from the assumption that resilience in the
short-term leads to adaptation in the long-term runs
directly into criticisms of reactionary conservatism,
deterministic thinking, and political naivety.86 For
instance, the capacity to maintain the vital functions
of a given social system may not always be exercised
in a progressive or desirable manner, particularly
from the viewpoint of the oppressed and margina-
lized who would rather see more radical change. In
this form, resilience may be seen as an apology for
incrementalism similar to that of the isomorphism of
TM where restorative stability is preferred to disrup-
tive alternatives. For this reason, human geographers
and other scholars working on international develop-
ment and security have been particularly critical of
the rise of resilience as a new interdisciplinary norm.
Some see this conservative form of resilience as depo-
liticizing climate change and reinforcing a neoliberal
form of governing that is responsible for escalating
socioeconomic inequality and vulnerability.87–90 In
response to such rebuttals, the transformational
potential of the concept has become increasingly dis-
cussed and much empirical work has been carried
out to track exactly how SE systems enact and
achieve their resilience in times of crisis and evolu-
tion. For instance, in relation to climate change adap-
tation Pelling (Ref 89, p. 79)91 proposes the
following typology:
• Resilience—functional persistence in a changing
environment. Change in technology, manage-
ment practice and organization.
• Transition—realize the full potential through
the exercise of rights within the established
regime. Change in practices of governance to
secure procedural justice; this can in turn lead
to incremental change in the governance
system.
• Transformation—reconﬁgure the structures of
development. Change overarching political-
economy regime.
As societal responses to climate change move toward
the transformational end of this continuum issues of
justice, legitimacy, authority, and representation will
need to be foregrounded.10,91 However, this may
prove impossible—both in theory and in practice—
from within the conﬁnes of a SE systems discourse
that deﬁnes resilience as an apolitical property, char-
acteristic, or function. If transformational social
change is to be achieved in an empowering and pro-
poor way then a more politicized view of climate
change adaptation is needed87,90,92 to expose, prob-
lematize, and resist the ongoing reproduction of
harmful power relations. Although it should be
noted, this is not to suggest that transformation itself
should become another new uncritical normative
goal—every norm should have its critique. As some
research has shown, stability and security may some-
times be preferable in order to avoid maladaptation
to climate change.93,94 Ultimately, responding to cli-
mate change should be seen not as a technical prob-
lem to be managed away but as an opportunity to
radically rethink and rebuild social, ecological, and
economic relations.39
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POLITICS AND POWER IN SYSTEMS:
FURTHERING AN INTERDISCIPLINARY
RESEARCH AGENDA
The above review has outlined considerable gaps in
the explanatory power of ST and SE frameworks,
especially when applied to contexts of society-wide
transformational change, for example, those associ-
ated with climate change mitigation and adaptation.
In particular, the enabling/constraining effects of
political structures and socially embedded power
relations are undertheorized. Without examining the
mediating role of politics and power in times of
uncertainty and change these perspectives will only
offer partial explanations for why truly transforma-
tional responses to climate change are still so rare.
Before illustrating how social theory may improve
our understanding of the origins of transformational
agendas and their agitation for expression, a brief
survey of existing interdisciplinary work in this vein
is necessary.
In addition to highlighting the hegemony of
neoliberal ideas about unrestricted markets and
individualism,40,77,88 critics of the mainstream cli-
mate change and systems research agenda have sug-
gested importing concepts from other disciplines
as well as combining them with completely different
perspectives. For instance, in order to get at the ‘poli-
tics behind policy,’ to (re)politicize TM and
adaptive governance, Meadowcroft21 and Kern30
suggest turning to political science for guidance in
three crucial areas of analysis: interests, institutions
and ideas. Resonating with the work of O’Brien and
Sygna12 and Shove and Walker13 on practical, politi-
cal, and personal aspects of responding to global
environmental change, this way of dividing up
(but not disconnecting) a given context for mitigation
or adaptation immediately opens socially oriented
lines of questioning: whose interests do practical
changes in technology and behavior serve, how are
political institutions constraining or enabling trans-
formations in society, which ideas are shaping
the process of change and inspiring personal
engagement?
In addition, Scrase and Smith22 offer a fairly
blunt and politically realist view; without a funda-
mental redistribution of power and resources the
diaspora of existing niche level innovations and
social movements pursuing a low-carbon future will
never ﬂourish. However, the types of power (instru-
mental, discursive, material, etc.) that are to be
addressed will vary depending on researchers’ and
practitioners’ epistemologies. Pertinent to all of these
suggestions is the thorny issue of cost and beneﬁt dis-
tribution, especially given the high demand on politi-
cal capital/feasibility entailed in any transformational
change.23 The need to be explicit and transparent
when discussing and calculating distributive pro-
cesses and outcomes is of central concern to climate
change and social change researchers alike. This is
just one reminder of the need to reinterpret how and
why technical information about ST and SE
systems is being presented as a rationale for pursuing
reformist rather than radical responses to climate
change.
Addressing some of these applied issues com-
mon to both systems theory and social science more
broadly requires good interdisciplinary research. As
Bailey and Wilson’s41 note, much work on ST transi-
tions and SE resilience does not actually theorize,
instead it presents a framework that tries to identify
and describe system processes through a techno-
centric or eco-centric lens, neglecting a host of
social theory insights and predictions about human
agency and power in times of change. But they also
point out that this need not be a permanent limita-
tion; it may in fact enable creative dialogue. Previous
interdisciplinary interventions have explored the
applicability of different power concepts within a
transitions framework,44 opened a dialogue between
ST and SE systems,11,18,19 and sought to deepen
the description of social processes95,96 all with the
aim of improving on-the-ground governance efﬁcacy.
However, in varying degrees, conceptual blind
spots (e.g., ideas and agency) remain, as does a
problematic tendency toward technical rather than
political forms of governance. Several reviews have
noted this limitation and proposed a more politicized
direction for research.20,21,64 This cross-fertilization
has expanded the scope and ambition of some
applied transitions work,15 but its inﬂuence on the
theoretical foundations of systems theory—as
applied to sustainability and climate change—has
been limited.45,47 Despite these efforts, there may
still be fundamental limitations to adopting a
systems based view of social change. Social processes
such as interpersonal relations, ideas, discourse,
and strategic action are capable of generating
and enacting transformational change but they can-
not be implicitly assumed or partially and clumsily
bolted on to what is at heart a functionalist episte-
mology. A more comprehensive engagement with
concepts from social theory can help to critically
examine these processes as well as demonstrate their
inﬂuential role in shaping social responses to climate
change.
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THE SEEDS OF CHANGE
The writings of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari
contain numerous concepts of relevance to ecological
thought and environmental politics.97–100 Collabor-
ating after the 1968 social movements in Paris, they
combined philosophy and psychology to propose an
approach to political activism that emphasized sub-
jects over systems, that is, agency over structure.101
Their work shares some ontological and epistemolog-
ical assumptions with ‘complex systems’ thinking,
inasmuch as they view society as made up of net-
worked connections among actors evolving in unpre-
dictable nonlinear ways. However, by describing this
as a spatially and temporally contingent ‘assemblage’
rather than as a deﬁnable system they emphasized
the creative potential of ever-changing, and often
conﬂicting, relations between actors (human and
nonhuman alike). Accordingly, the discord and insta-
bility of micropolitics as opposed to the consensus
and isomorphism of management are seen as the
most potent opportunities for innovation and change
to emerge.102
In practice, this position supports recent calls
for more pluralistic and positive environmental poli-
tics that can bring conﬂicting worldviews together in
search of an adequate response to the threats of
global climate change.8,63,66 However, inclusivity
alone is not enough, as the repeated shortcomings of
international climate negotiations attest. Genuinely
participatory and novel interactions will have to take
place in less aggregated arenas, that is, not just multi-
actor governance dancing to the tune of top–down
prescriptions or the seemingly unassailable logic of
globalized economic markets.39 Social, cultural, and
political différence ought to be celebrated for its pro-
vocations (differing) not its legitimizing (deferring)
effects. As political theories of learning suggest, in
the context of environmental policy we can expect
macropolitical structures (e.g., institutions and para-
digms) to produce incremental or ‘of a kind’
change41,60 and the micropolitical (e.g., personal net-
works and social movements) to produce radically
alternative discourses and practices.17,41,91 To illus-
trate, the governments and industries of most
wealthy countries—and the international institutions
they dominate—have predominantly sought to
reform rather than rethink the social and economic
arrangements responsible for anthropogenic climate
change, for example, through ecological moderniza-
tion and green capitalism. Yet, however hegemonic
such discourses of global capitalism may appear
there are always cracks in the system to be found
and exploited. Contradicting Lukes’103 notion of a
totalizing cognitive form of power, Deleuze and
Guattari remind us of the creative potential of
intersubjectivity,101 of the destabilizing effect of
actors’ expressive and material capacities when they
come together and collide with each other and with
the status quo. Whether in the economic degrowth
road to emissions reductions or the postdevelopment
approach to climate change adaptation, there are
numerous transformational discourses and practices
that reject the very foundations of more reformist
agendas.63
So what does all this add to the ST and SE nar-
ratives of change? One major advantage is that it
affords actors a latent capacity—or agency
potential—that is obscured by the systems perspec-
tives, that is, a potential to be and to act in a multi-
plicity of ways in relation to other actors or systems
and across time and space. It thereby makes the con-
tingency rather than the functionality of systems
more analytically important104 or, in simpler words,
the who and why rather than the how and when. In
practice, this prompts us to look more closely at a
given individual’s or a society’s low-carbon initia-
tives; are they temporary commitments? Contradict-
ing their espoused values? Or are these efforts
potentially transformative inasmuch as they seek to
replace the framing of industrial growth with one of
human–environment wellbeing? Similarly, as vulnera-
ble societies seek to build resilience and preemptively
adapt to climate change, are they prioritizing eco-
nomic functions, communal ways of life or ecosystem
integrity? Which actors and institutions are responsi-
ble for governing the transformation and why might
they seek to steer it in a certain direction? Answering
such questions will require consideration of different
actors’ ideas and interests but also the sociocultural
peculiarities of their interactions with one another.
Without such micropolitical detail descriptions of
social change will always tend toward the aggregate,
eliding the daily creative conﬂict of actors, networks,
and worldviews in favor of broad conclusions about
structure, management, and hegemony. Perhaps, the
biggest challenge this poses to ST and SE frameworks
is the need to look beyond the system. Dissolving the
discrete levels and borders of the multilevel perspec-
tive or the SE system might open up their actors and
institutions to potentially transformational engage-
ment with fundamentally alien discourses and
practices.
Beyond the theoretical beneﬁt of bringing forth
novel responses to climate change—which should not
be understated given the current reformist agenda’s
protracted failure and the growing appetite for trans-
formational alternatives—this perspective may also
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provide concrete lessons for improving mitigation
and adaptation outcomes. For example, energy and
climate change researchers mobilizing this sort of
conceptual lens have produced interesting readings of
supply–demand instability105,106 as well as insights
into the political-ethical issues of energy distribution
and justice.53,107 In both instances, disruptive actors
problematize the technical assumptions of low-
carbon transition narratives, offering vital lessons
about unintended consequences, the mutability of
technology and the nuances of the social context.
Similarly, in terms of public engagement with the
environmental policy process, differences in ratio-
nales (e.g., instrumental, legalistic, technocratic, or
subversive) abound due to the way participation is
deﬁned and enacted in different political institutional
contexts.56 On the one hand, these potentially con-
ﬂicting discursive practices may produce creative fric-
tion and radical alternatives but they also pose
serious problems to the successful functioning of cli-
mate policy and governance. Vital to all of these
accounts it the possibility for more relational and
interpretivist descriptions of power to be made avail-
able.65,108 Such approaches are arguably well suited
to the pursuit of transformational outcomes that nec-
essarily involve changes in worldviews, values, and
beliefs.39,44,109 As Jørgensen36 and Shove38 both
point out, such a detailed and ideational view of
agency is largely omitted by the structural emphasis
of systems frameworks. This oversight will need to
be remedied, particularly as more complex and net-
worked forms of climate change governance (e.g.,
transnational low-carbon cities initiatives and multi-
regional ecosystem management) continue to prolif-
erate, placing greater stress on social institutions to
accommodate and articulate the desired outcomes of
very different types of actors.78,110,111 Paying atten-
tion to these dynamics may facilitate novel responses
to climate change, it may enable more reﬂexive and
inclusive forms of governance but it may also throw
light on the fundamental incompatibility or limited
reach of generalized mitigation and adaptation
initiatives.
SOCIAL FIELDS
If the notion of micropolitics encourages us to con-
sider more closely the origins of social change, then
we still need to explore how it gets enacted. For
social theories explicitly concerned with the creative
dualism of structure and agency, transformational
strategies are usually described as being both con-
strained and enabled by the existing rules of the
game but also as having the capacity to shape the
structures of the social ﬁelds in which they are
enacted.112–115 Fligstein and McAdam114 describe
these social ﬁelds as ‘socially constructed arenas
within which actors with varying resource endow-
ments vie for advantage’ (Ref 112, p. 10) and where
there are ‘shared (which is not to say consensual)
understandings about the purpose of the ﬁeld, rela-
tionships to others in the ﬁeld (including who has
power and why), and the rules governing legitimate
action’ (Ref 112, p. 9, parentheses in original). Cru-
cially the role of agency is foregrounded in a way
that links actors’ intentions and inﬂuence to the
personal—or ideational—realm.
To some extent, the ST and SE frameworks
have incorporated similar insights from instititional-
ist theory addressing agency-structure dynamics in
their analyses through the concepts of path depend-
ency and vested interests. However, this has mostly
produced research on instances of continuity or pro-
cesses of long-term change,14,116,117 neglecting the
more sociological strands of this discipline that are
capable of accounting for values, worldviews, dis-
courses, and power relations in more detail.85,118,119
The important role of institutions or, more broadly
speaking, social ﬁelds in steering responses to climate
change and environmental crises cannot be under-
stated. For instance, much research on adaptation
has learnt from the well-rehearsed critiques of inter-
national development by acknowledging the dangers
of overriding or ignoring locally situated practices
often associated with public goods, biodiversity, and
social action.69,116,120,121 This is precisely why we
need to pay greater attention to the micropolitical
struggles to resist, rethink and replace those institu-
tions that continue to fail to articulate the plural
values and priorities of society.
Characterizing climate change as an ampliﬁer
of existing social, economic and ecological proble-
matics can be particularly instructive here. Rather
than a stand-alone problem with a technical solution,
climate change imperatives combine with the already
present agitations of marginalized groups or issues to
call into question the current rules of the game, pre-
senting a highly visible opportunity to negotiate alter-
natives.3 In social movements, this is often referred
to as an episode of contention114 and in political sci-
ence as a window of opportunity.122 What both
point to is the inﬂuential power of ideas and agency
in shaping the transformation of a social ﬁeld.85
More precisely, it is their power to problematize; the
moment when social ills are diagnosed and remedies
prescribed through recourse to scientiﬁc, economic,
moral, and/or political discourses.123 Such moments
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can be pivotal as they are never politically neutral or
technically impartial and can have long lasting conse-
quences. For instance, deﬁning greenhouse gases as a
market failure that could be internalized has pro-
duced dysfunctional emissions trading schemes that
favor the already powerful and continue to fall short
of their own modest objectives. So too with adapta-
tion, seeing vulnerability as simply an information/
expertise deﬁcit produces knowledge and technology
transfer initiatives that may be incompatible with, or
even harmful to, their recipients’ ways of life. For
actors concerned with countering these top-down dis-
courses it is not sufﬁcient just to have access to
resources (e.g., varieties of capital; economic, social,
and political), it is their entrepreneurial and innova-
tive utilization—creating uncertainty and offering
compelling critiques and alternatives—that mat-
ters.124,125 Some strands of SE resilience research
have begun to include such considerations in their
framework via the notion of transformational
agency;84 something that is carried by certain indivi-
duals involved in adaptive ecosystem management.
The scope for developing this work is promising and
certainly reaches beyond localized natural resource
management practices. Examples where this line of
research has proved insightful include: climate policy-
making that favors low-carbon energy,126 innovative
policy processes,62 and integration of climate goals
into economic trade rules.127 Vitally, and in corre-
spondence to the above section on the seeds of
change, this focus on the interpretive aspects of
agency-structure dynamics before, during and after
moments of crisis has helped to explain how seem-
ingly marginal ideas can gain inﬂuence within and
across social ﬁelds.
In social ﬁelds where shared interests and
understandings exist between actors, there is more
at stake than mere instrumental power or rational
competition. There exists a microcosm of cognitive
and communicative relations, a multiplicity of
values and the potential for creative, but also trouble-
some, conﬂict. If these sociological and ideational
dimensions are made explicit—for example, through
more representative and deliberative forms of
governance128,129—then not only will our under-
standing of how they affect transformational climate
change mitigation and adaptation be improved but
they may be harnessed toward producing more sig-
niﬁcant outcomes.130–132 Assessing the inﬂuence of
cognitive–communicative exchanges between certain
actors, particularly during periods of uncertainty and
crisis, has certainly enriched our understanding of
how political institutions change or persist over
longer periods of time,133,134 but what is required
now is an expansion of this type of research, to
address more informal and sprawling social ﬁelds.
Granted, the borders of social ﬁelds are permeable
and overlapping, capable of crossing multiple levels,
territories and temporalities (especially where climate
change is concerned), but this ﬂexibility is both a
challenge to practitioners and scholars to remain
attuned to their dynamic relational qualities and an
opportunity for those same qualities to produce and
enact genuinely transformational change.
CONCLUSION
Transformational social change can be said to
involve a broad set of interrelated processes: practi-
cal, political and personal in nature. In the context of
climate change mitigation and adaptation, two prom-
inent agendas (ST transitions and SE resilience) both
utilize a systems perspective to address some of these
issues. However, certain conceptual blind spots (par-
ticularly regarding politics, power, agency, and ideas)
have not only limited the scope of their analyses but
have also led to problematic governance prescrip-
tions. Whilst some strands of TM and adaptive
comanagement do acknowledge the existence of com-
peting visions for a climate compatible future, in gen-
eral there is a tendency to try to control this
potentially creative force through a process of iso-
morphism, managerialist steering and consensus
building. Reﬂexivity and social learning are encour-
aged by both approaches but little is said of how
ideas and inﬂuences mediate this process and to what
extent this reinforces a incremental rather than trans-
formational trajectory. Such an approach will not
only favor technical and behavioral solutions to cli-
mate change but it may do so in a politically naïve
way that struggles to challenge the dominant ideas
and institutional inertia of societies with high/rising
emissions and large swathes of vulnerable
communities.
In response, we may turn to social theories—
where power, politics, and social relations are of cen-
tral concern—for insights and provocations. If ST
and SE systems are to become more productive inter-
disciplinary frameworks capable of politically con-
textualized climate governance prescriptions then
they will need more socially oriented theories of
change. First, focusing on the contingent relations
between various actors (human and nonhuman) and
their assemblages (e.g., an industry or a community)
instantly opens up possibilities for more radical inno-
vation and adaptability beyond the discursive
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conﬁnes of a functionalist system perspective. Sec-
ond, the interpretive and strategic actions of inﬂuen-
tial actors before, during, and after moments of crisis
and agitation have to be made explicit. Tracking
these processes across space and time exposes both
the creative potential of social interactions and the
institutionalized rules of the game that enable or
constrain them. Immediately, critical questions
emerge around why some mitigation and adaptation
actions are successful or not and to what extent they
capable of driving transformational change. Or in
other words, whose vision of a climate compatible
future is being pursued and along which pathways?
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